Blackout or gas shortage – How would Germany deal with an energy emergency?

Content

1. How likely is a blackout in Germany?
   • What is a blackout?
   • What is a brownout?
   • What measures has the government taken to secure energy supply?
2. What could lead to a power shortage this winter?
3. What could happen in case of a power supply shortage?
4. How ready are municipalities and institutions for power cuts?
5. How likely is a severe gas shortage and what would happen?
6. How would German authorities react to a gas supply emergency?
7. What protections are in place against sabotage of critical infrastructure?
8. Who to contact when reporting on an energy emergency?

1. How likely is a blackout in Germany?

A large-scale blackout or even brownouts are extremely unlikely this winter, according to the federal network agency (BNetzA). The German power supply is among the most reliable worldwide and the country’s grid is designed with multiple redundancies and numerous safety mechanisms – which are regularly tested and adjusted – to prevent a complete collapse of the network, even during major disruptions, according to BNetzA.

Given the current energy crisis, the German government tasked the country’s transmission system operators (TSOs) to examine the security of the electricity grid through tougher external conditions. These two so-called stress-tests assessed the grid’s reliability over the coming winter and explored whether Germany would have sufficient electricity production capacity with its nuclear plants going offline at the end of the year, as was the plan in summer.

The results of the second stress-test, which took into account several developments (see Q3 below) on energy markets, showed that “crisis-like situations in the power system for some hours are very unlikely in the winter of 2022/2023 but cannot be ruled out entirely at the moment.” Specifically, TSOs found that, under specific scenarios, Germany could not be certain of receiving enough energy from abroad in case of a shortfall (Germany's grid is highly interconnected with its neighbouring countries), so energy demand might not be met for a couple of hours without additional measures (explained below).

“A large-scale power blackout in Germany is extremely unlikely,” said the Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK). Similarly, “the likelihood of forced shutdowns occurring regionally and for a limited period of time is considered low.”

2. What could lead to a power shortage this winter?

Transmission grids transport electricity, and there must be a balance between the volume of electricity generated and the demand. Power cuts could happen when this balance is disrupted, either through a shortage in electricity production or congestion in the powerlines. According to the stress-test, specifically this winter could see the power supply situation “become critical” if power generation and re-dispatch capacity (a change in the operating availability of power plants) nationally and abroad is reduced through:

• The reduced availability of France's nuclear power fleet, potential export reductions from Poland through a limited availability of coal-fired power plants, or reduced power generation from gas plants in southern Germany and Austria through a shortage of the fossil fuel.
• Low water levels in the Rhine and Neckar rivers and bottlenecks in the rail network prevent the transport of coal to power plants.
• Sudden increase in energy demand through the use of electric heaters during cold spells (overall, meteorological services currently project a milder winter).
• Low gas reserves, as gas power plants play a crucial role in securing grid stability on dark, windless days.

3. What could happen in case of a power supply shortage?

If the measures to reduce the likelihood of power cuts aren’t enough to secure a balance between supply and demand, TSOs have announced the following steps could be taken to avoid a collapse of the entire network:

1. Increase re-dispatch potential to avoid bottlenecks in the transport of power between north and south Germany. Bottlenecks could happen in all scenarios explored in the stress-test and, to be resolved, would require increased re-dispatch potential. This can be achieved through additional power plants in the reserve nationally, and through securing re-dispatch potential from abroad “on a larger scale than previously planned”. Re-dispatch measures are common but it is unclear whether power plant capacity can actually be made available by Germany’s European partners this winter, according to the economy ministry.
2. Should prevention measures not be enough to maintain grid stability, TSOs could limit or restrict power exports to neighbouring countries to secure national supply “as a last resort,” said the stress test.
3. Also as a last resort, and only if a supra-regional supply-demand unbalance remains, TSOs can restrict or control the electricity used by large consumers temporarily, says BNetzA. Large energy-intensive industrial companies are directly connected to the high-voltage distribution grid, which allows them to be disconnected from the grid for a restricted period. As far as possible, “only those companies that can best handle a short-term switch off will be targeted,” said Jochen Jung, principal asset manager at TSO TenneT, in a press conference. He added that TSOs are in close contact with energy-intensive industries.

4. How ready are municipalities and institutions for power cuts?

Industry and facilities where power supply is critical (such as hospitals) are generally prepared for a temporary power cut by having power generators and/or emergency plans. The degree of preparedness varies between institutions depending on their importance as so-called critical infrastructure, according to BNetzA. According to a survey by the German Hospital Institute (DKI) reported by business daily Handelsblatt, 59 percent of hospitals in Germany could cope with a power outage for a handful of days, with 21 percent only able to secure continued power supply for a few hours. Should a power blackout last several days, only 14 percent of hospitals surveyed would be able to provide patient care as usual, but 40 percent could do so with significant restrictions, according to the report.

Individual municipalities are also preparing blackout emergency plans, such as purchasing emergency generators and turning fire stations into “lighthouses” where citizens can (alongside other services) receive information, charge critical technology or warm up. Representatives from politics, the fire brigade, police, rescue service, disaster control, grid operators and energy suppliers have been meeting across German cities to draw up plans, procure power generators, identify critical infrastructure and prepare contact points for citizens, according to Handelsblatt.

Most state ministries and some of their subordinate authorities have emergency power generators and their own fuel stocks, the government said answering a small parliamentary enquiry in mid-December. These should generally last for 72 hours – as recommended by the BBK – with some states going beyond and keeping additional fuel stocks. The federal government considers the existing equipment to be “sufficient overall”.

Speaking about the potential of regional, targeted power cuts with newspaper Welt am Sonntag, BBK chief Ralph Tiesler warned about the varying preparedness for such crisis situations between municipalities in Germany, saying some are in an “exemplary” position but others “are not sufficiently prepared” with precise plans and power supply guarantees.

Find publicly available emergency plans of individual municipalities (in German) here.  

5. How likely is a severe gas shortage and what would happen?

The association of gas storage system operators in Germany INES said in November 2022 that although gas shortages cannot yet be completely ruled out in theory, they are "extremely unlikely to occur in view of current weather forecasts."

Possible gas shortages would affect Germany gradually, with regional differences, and there could be several temporary events during the winter instead of one long national shortage, the grid agency BNetzA has said. Scenario calculations by BNetzA also showed that, due to well-filled storages, a shortage would likely only happen towards the end of the winter – if at all. According to industry association VCI, the South is likely to be affected first because it has fewer storages and the grid is not designed for strong flows from north to south.

A shortage could mean rising prices, supply interruption for certain consumers, permanent damage to industrial installations, and the need to restart heating boilers in hundreds of thousands of households. It could even lead to a domino effect in supply chains, when the production of basic materials is cut, which are necessary for other processes. In the long term, effects could include job cuts and a worsening the recession which is already projected by the government for 2023.

Read the Clean Energy Wire Q&A “What happens if Russia’s gas supplies to Germany are cut?” for more in-depth information.

6. How would German authorities react to a gas supply emergency?

Depending on the severity of gas supply disruption, the expected economic and technical impact and the urgency of resolving the disruption at the national level, the economy ministry can declare the emergency level – the third and last level of a gas crisis (the first two levels have already been declared in 2022: early warning and alert). In that case, the Federal Network Agency (BNetzA) becomes the national supply coordinator (Bundeslastverteiler) and is responsible for allocating gas in close coordination with the network operators. It then oversees the rationing of available supply.

In contrast to the first two crisis levels, there is then a need to additionally resort to state intervention to guarantee gas supply to cover vital needs, with particular attention given to protected customers. Certain groups of consumers are specially protected by law and must receive gas if possible. These protected consumers include households and social institutions such as hospitals, but also essential power and water supply.

BNetzA has said there is no fixed shutdown sequence for gas consumers. It argues that decisions in the event of a shortage will be made on a case-by-case basis because the circumstances depend on so many variables that cannot be foreseen (including levels of gas storage, weather conditions, European requirements, reduced consumption, etc). To help make decisions during a crisis, the BNetzA requested gas grid operators and industrial customers to specify their consumption levels and future gas needs on the “Gas Security Platform.” It has also said that it would take into account companies’ past savings efforts when rationing the scarce supply.

The agency has also has introduced five indicators to assess the status of gas supply in Germany. These are weather forecast, temperature-adjusted gas consumption, storage levels, situation in neighbouring countries and base load procurability, and measure each status as stable, tense or critical. The indicators are there to provide an overview for policymakers and should help the government to decide if or when to declare the emergency level. BNetzA also publishes a daily update of the status of gas supply in Germany.

A crisis room has been specially set up on the premises of the BNetzA as a situation centre where the crisis teams can find all the necessary information and communication facilities in 24-hour operation. The situation centre has its own power generation and water supply and is available even in the event of a dramatic expansion of the supply crisis.

During a gas crisis, a crisis team advises the economy ministry. The ministry chairs the team. It is composed of representatives from the interior ministry, the transmission grid operators (TSOs), Trading Hub Europe (THE) and the BNetzA. State energy ministries could be part of the team, depending on which region is affected, and there might be local crisis teams. Other market participants like distribution grid operators, or associations such as BDEW and VKU might be asked to support the team as non-permanent members.

7. What protections are in place against sabotage of critical infrastructure?

The likelihood of attacks to critical infrastructure – whether in the form of a physical or cyberattack – is being viewed with renewed attention in Germany following this summer’s explosions in the Nord Stream pipelines and infrastructure attacks against the railway group Deutsche Bahn. Further attacks on telecommunication networks and energy supply, both in quantity and quality, should be taken into consideration, an internal threat assessment by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) found, newspaper Morgenpost reported.

While the federal government sees the risk of an increase in cyber threats due to the gas shortage as “rather negligible”, the interior ministry has called for tighter security regulations for all sectors considered critical infrastructure. “The federal and state security authorities, as well as the operators of critical infrastructures in particular, must continue to ramp up their protective measures and prepare for all crisis scenarios,” said interior minister Nancy Faeser. Critical infrastructure in the energy sector are those companies that supply power, gas, fuel or heating oil, or district heating. This includes generation, production, extraction, distribution and trade.

Sabotage of critical infrastructure “is, sadly, not a new question for us,” Jochen Jung, principal asset manager at TSO TenneT, told Clean Energy Wire. TSOs have prepared and continuously assess multiple security plans and responses for decades and have a whole department for protection of property, he said, adding that crucial digital communications are completely independent from the internet and can therefore not be accessed from outside.

Gas storage facilities are also well protected, with their security being stepped up following climate activists actions in 2021, Frank Dietzsch, head of regulatory frameworks of gas technologies at the German technical association for gas and water (DVGW), told broadcaster NRD. Relevant infrastructure is secured with fences, alarms, video surveillance, access barriers, and detections systems amongst others.

The EU has also boosted action against cyber threats and aims to “enhance cooperation and investments in cyber defence to better protect, detect, deter, and defend against a growing number of cyber-attacks.”