Q&A: What does the German coalition government break-up mean for climate and energy?

Germany's coalition government under Olaf Scholz has come to an early end – on the day Donald Trump won the U.S. presidential election. The chancellor sacked his finance minister after long internal disputes over the right way forward on economic recovery and the energy transition. The break-up now leaves the country with a host of unfinished policy proposals that risk grinding to a halt until a snap election is held and a new government is sworn in next year. This includes urgent matters such as Germany's 2025 budget, without which many climate, energy, and industry support programmes could be left hanging in the balance for months, unless a minority government manages to forge new majorities in parliament.
Scholz announcing the sacking of finance minister Lindner on 6 November. Screenshot: German Federal Government

Why did the coalition government break up?

Days of intense negotiations in Germany’s three-party coalition over the country’s budget for 2025 culminated in chancellor Olaf Scholz firing finance minister Christian Lindner on the evening of 6 November. The news came almost exactly one year after a seminal ruling by Germany’s highest court on the country’s so-called "debt brake", which declared billions of euros – initially borrowed for pandemic relief but reallocated for climate and energy policy – unlawful. This led to continuous battles within the coalition over how to finance its most important government projects.

In a statement immediately following the sacking, Scholz from the Social Democrats (SPD) said his treasurer, from the pro-business Free Democrats (FDP), had shown “no willingness” to reach an agreement on the budget, even after Scholz and Green Party economy minister Robert Habeck presented various budget proposals to Lindner. “Such egotistic behaviour is incomprehensible,” the chancellor said, adding that Lindner had previously “blocked laws on unrelated grounds” and constantly put the interests of his party above those of the country.

At a time of when the country faces great challenges from economic stagnationurgently needed energy and climate investmentsRussia’s war on Ukraine and the election of a new government in the U.S., Scholz said that he could no longer tolerate his lack of trust in Lindner and that he asked German president Frank-Walter Steinmeier to formally dismiss Lindner from his position. Green economy minister Habeck agreed in a separate statement with Scholz that Lindner’s behaviour was no longer tenable for the coalition. He said the finance minister’s sacking was “as logical as it was unnecessary” at a time when Europe’s largest economy requires a functioning government to weather global challenges.

Lindner, in his own statement, said he had rejected a demand by Scholz to suspend the country’s constitutional ceiling on new debt for 2025 to allow additional investments in economic recovery, the energy system and security, including military support for Ukraine. He also argued that the chancellor had constantly “downplayed” Germany’s economic difficulties in the past months. In the week leading to the break-up, a leaked position paper signed by Lindner  put the FDP leader starkly at odds with his two political partners by demanding a raft of substantial policy measures that contradicted both their coalition obligations and a draft budget agreed in summer, including over climate and energy policy issues.

What are the immediate consequences of the finance minister’s sacking?

One party leaving the coalition does not immediately lead to early elections. However, in his address, Scholz said that he would initiate a vote of confidence in parliament on 15 January. With most of FDP’s members of parliament set to defect from the government ranks, Scholz is unlikely to win the motion. This action, last used by a German chancellor in 2005, is formally required before the chancellor can ask president Steinmeier to dissolve parliament and call a new election, which is likely to happen in March if Scholz’s schedule holds. In the interim period until a snap election is held, the remainder of the coalition will stay in office and seek to find agreements with the largest opposition group, the conservative alliance of the Christian Democrat Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU), to carry out the most important government duties.

Chancellor Scholz said he would seek to implement several urgent policy decisions this year by forging majorities on technical questions in parliament. These include measures to stabilise the pension system, adopting EU migration and asylum regulations and emergency support measures for Germany’s industry, he added. The latter includes lowering electricity prices, for which the government already in 2023 agreed state support of more than five billion euros to relieve customers from high grid fees. The debt brake ruling confounded the plan’s implementation in 2024. The chancellor further said urgent measures were also required in the automotive industry, for example through new support schemes for electric vehicles.

It is doutbful whether Scholz can actually succeed. CDU leader Friedrich Merz generally singalled his readiness to cooperate with Scholz but rejected the chancellor’s snap election roadmap, arguing that Germany could not wait for several months to find a new leadership. He said the vote of confidence should be initiated already next week, with the aim to hold elections in the second half of January. In the period after an election is held but no new government has been formed, the typical role of a caretaker government falls on incumbent ministers and the chancellor.

Shortly after Scholz’s announcement on the evening of 6 November, the FDP said it would withdraw its other three ministers from the government cabinet, completing the coalition’s collapse. However, transport minister Volker Wissing on the next day said he had accepted an offer by Scholz to remain in office and instead announced that he would leave the FDP. Scholz on Thursday also replaced finance minister Lindner with Jörg Kukies, his own SPD state secretary in the chancellery and a former investment banker. The remaining two vacant FDP ministries could temporarily become integrated in the portfolio of other cabinet members.

Until parliament is dissolved, the current government remains in place. However, as Germany’s first minority government at the national level, it faces great difficulties in parliament when making any long-term decisions on new laws or the budget given that a voting majority is no longer guaranteed. Apart from the CDU/CSU and the FDP, the minority government could rely on votes by members of the Left Party, the nationalist-left Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) or the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD).

In the end, dissolving parliament could become the only realistic option to ensure a functioning government with the power to make policy.

What are the consequences of having no federal budget agreement?

The finance minister’s departure means that a decision on the 2025 budget before the start of the new year is very unlikely. Likewise, the adoption of an adjusted 2024 budget also appears improbable. The latter is needed as state revenues are lower than expected and expenditures, for example on renewables support, are higher. A decision was initially planned for mid-November, as a new budget legally must be adopted before the beginning of each budget year to allow the parliament’s cross-party budget committee to scrutinise the spending plans for each ministry. This is then followed by a vote in parliament, usually decided by the government’s majority.

The draft 2025 budget agreed during the summer is totalling more than 480 billion euros. The coalition parties were still debating a budgetary hole of less than ten billion euros before the FDP leader’s sacking. However, the budget talks were complicated by the debt brake ruling, which in 2023 forced the government to reshuffle about 60 billion euros earmarked for the country’s Climate and Transformation Fund (CTF). For the 2024 budget, this meant that the spending plan had to be redrawn at the last minute and adopted retroactively, which happened in February of the same year.

However, finding a solution could take significantly longer this time. Even if a minority government continues after the FDP’s removal, there will be no formally agreed spending plan for the election year 2025. The country could end up running with a provisional budget for months on end, starting from 1 January. This means that government spending would be mostly limited to services for which there is a legal claim by recipients. Without a fixed budget for the new year and under provisional spending, no new commitments can be made, and existing programmes cannot be expanded. Support programmes that lack a clear legal claim to funding, including from the CTF, would have to be stopped.

In early 2024, the fact that the government had to postpone adoption of the budget to the new year meant that many programmes financed through the Climate and Transformation Fund had to be temporarily stopped. Applications to the CTF were opened again in late January, after it became clear how much money would have to be cut and where.

Provisional and reduced spending would take effect until the minority government obtains majority backing in parliament or until a new government is sworn in and decides a budget, which might take as long as mid-2025. This would mean months of uncertainty for Germany’s industry, which hopes to secure billions in support funding in the 2025 budget for their contribution to help the country reach greenhouse gas neutrality. If the government fails to agree a budget on time, state support during next year could hang in the balance for many companies.

The government will retain its ability to fund its most important and urgent affairs. This includes the financing of administrations, social security payments, or existing support programmes and construction projects with an agreed spending plan.

What climate and energy plans are now up in the air?

There are many plans, strategies and draft laws at different stages of the agreement process that are now hanging in the balance. It is unclear whether majorities will be found in parliament to pass them. These include:

  • The Power Plant Security Act, which included tenders for H2-ready gas power plants and the introduction of a capacity market. This act is set to ensure that a sufficient number of gas-fired power plants are built in the coming years to guarantee supply security in the future at times of little wind or sunshine. The tenders are also seen as key for an earlier coal phase-out, as the government had planned to hold the first round of auctions for public support at the beginning of 2025. This is now highly unlikely as there is no budget agreement for the coming year. Plans had already been delayed due to the budget crisis towards the end of 2023.
  • electricity market reform, which is tightly linked to the point above, and included points on future renewables support, flexible electricity use, local pricing signals, and generation capacities which can be made available whenever needed. The aim of the reform is to ensure the market is cost-effective, to incentivise sufficient investments in new capacity, to coordinate supply and demand with local grid development, and to increase system flexibility.
  • The carbon management strategy, which is meant to create the framework for using technologies to capture, store, transport and use CO2 (CCS/CCU), and has yet to be decided by parliament. Passing the strategy would require support from the opposition, which means "the fragile compromise that has been laboriously worked out is likely to break apart again," SWP researcher Felix Schenuit wrote on LinkedIn. It could also have considerable consequences for EU-funded CCS projects that are already underway, he added.
  • An aid package for the automotive industry, which was part of talks for the 2025 budget. Other ideas to boost electric vehicle sales and support the country's ailing car industry included a petrol price surcharge and a scrappage premium for old combustion engine cars. Additionally, funds earmarked for investments in the country's railways (18 billion euros according to a draft bill for 2025) now face an uncertain future.
  • The climate adaptation strategy, the draft of which had just finished consultations with stakeholders and was set to be adopted in cabinet by December. The strategy, which was drafted with input from all ministries, for the first time spelled out legally binding climate adaptation targets.
  • A "biomass package", which was set to be discussed in November and was intended to creating a framework for sustainable, resource-efficient and climate-friendly biomass production and use.
  • draft geothermal acceleration act, which had already reached the parliamentary agreement stage. It included provisions on overriding public interest (which make the licensing of projects easier), as well as changes in mining law, water law and nature conservation law.

How will parties position themselves on climate and energy for the next election?

The parties have yet to present election programmes for the 2025 federal election, initially scheduled to take place in autumn. Most had planned to do so only around late spring (see here for their positions ahead of the last election in 2021). This process is now going to be sped up significantly.

Current polls show the conservative CDU/CSU alliance, Angela Merkel’s former party, comfortably in the lead at around 35 percent, so that it could lead the next coalition government. Current CDU leader Merz therefore stands a good chance of leading the next government coalition.

It was under Merkele's Conservatives' leadership that Germany introduced its landmark climate law and the target to become greenhouse gas neutral by 2045. However, after moving into opposition in 2021, the Conservatives have opposed several climate policy measures, such as the phase out of combustion engine cars or strict rules to phase out fossil fuel heating. In a recent position paper, conservative lawmakers also called for an expert assessment of whether recently decommissioned nuclear power plants could be reactivated – although chancellor candidate Friedrich Merz has largely ruled this out.

The Social Democrats (SPD) have generally been in favour of more ambitious climate policy. Chancellor Scholz has made clear that he intends to invest heavily into both security — for example support to Ukraine — and social cohesion, social security and jobs. Scholz said an either - or "is poison" when it comes to "investing enough in our security, in good jobs, a modern economy and a functioning infrastructure."

The Green Party has always been in favour of ambitious climate, energy transition and nature protection policy. It has called for an earlier coal phase-out than agreed in Germany (2038 at the latest) and policy in line with the 1.5°C temperature rise limit of the Paris Climate Agreement.

In the position paper that played a part in breaking up the coalition, FDP leader Lindner put into question some key German climate policies. These included measures for emission reductions, such as targets for climate-friendly heating, should be delayed and more ambitious national climate targets be abandoned and replaced by joint European targets and regulation. The finance minister also called for the abolition of EU-wide rules, such as the EU taxonomy on sustainable investment criteria , the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, and vehicle fleet emissions limits.

The AfD — with almost no chance of entering a coalition, because all other parties have ruled out cooperation — is the only major party to reject the science on human-made climate change, going against overwhelming empirical evidence. In its 2024 EU election manifesto, it said that the "claim of a threat through human-made climate change" is "CO2 hysterics", an "eco-socialist project" which reduces prosperity and takes away freedom. It wants to "abolish all climate laws at the national and European level, as well as stop the Green Deal”.

New to the political scene and with a good chance to enter parliament after the next election is the nationalist-leftwing, anti-immigrant and pro-Russia Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), which mostly consist of former members of the Left Party. Wagenknecht's breakaway alliance has criticised much of the government’s climate policy and has called for completely resuming energy trading with Russia.

What are the break-up’s effects in the EU and globally?

Government members and political observers had warned that Germany must avoid a high-stakes gamble around the time of the U.S. election, as a re-election of Donald Trump would herald in years of uncertainty at the global scale.

Trump’s win was announced when Berlin woke up on 6 November, and the German coalition broke apart when the country was heading to bed. The government thus failed to project stability in a challenging geopolitical situation and in the face of economic woes. Chancellor Scholz is now seen as a “lame duck” leader.

However, the government remains in power and continues its work at the European and global level.

Economy minister Robert Habeck told public broadcaster Deutschlandfunk that the government still had power and authority internationally. “We are fully capable of acting on foreign policy, in the EU Councils and in international forums such as the G7 and G20,” he said. That would include giving the formal green light among EU member state leaders for the next European Commission later this year.

European Parliament president Roberta Metsola called for political stability and on all actors to “act with responsibility.” She added that “Europe is not strong without a strong Germany” and the developments were “very important for us.”

The ministries responsible for international climate policy – the foreign office and in addition the ministries for economy and climate, the environment, and development – are all led by politicians from the Green Party or the Social Democrats. Whether ministers will travel to the UN climate change conference in Baku, Azerbaijan next week remains to be seen. However, the negotiation team is likely to remain unaffected by the coalition break-up, and Germany is part of the joint EU delegation.

All texts created by the Clean Energy Wire are available under a “Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Licence (CC BY 4.0)” . They can be copied, shared and made publicly accessible by users so long as they give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made.

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